Journal Articles

Are Mapmakers Able to Target and Protect Congressional Incumbents?: The Institutional Dynamics of Electoral Competition

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Can those in charge of redistricting foster electoral competitiveness by targeting some congressional incumbents while protecting others from potent competition? We provide an answer by presenting the dynamic redistricting thesis, which holds that the type of redistricting plan and the time passed since its enactment affect the emergence of high-quality congressional candidates. We demonstrate that the effect of redistricting on competition depends on whether incumbents belong to the party that controlled the redistricting process. We show that partisan plans have predictable systematic effects, with incumbents in the minority more likely to face strong opponents. Moreover, the effect of redistricting on competition is highest at the beginning of the 10-year redistricting cycle and diminishes in a nonlinear fashion over the course of the cycle. The implications of our theory and findings for democracy are apparent: Institutions are an important determinant of the variation of electoral competition across time and space.

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Detail Information

Series Title

American Politics Research

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publication., 2009

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

1532-673x

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 37, No. 6, November 2009.pp. 955-982

Subject(s)

Representation
Electoral Competition
Congressional elections
Incumbency
Apportionment
Dynamic redistricting thesis
Are Mapmakers Able to Target

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