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Journal Articles

The Leader Rule: A Model of Strategic Approval Voting in a Large Electorate

The article considers Approval Voting for a large population of voters. It is supposed that voters evaluate the relative likelihood of pairwise ties among candidates based on statistical information about candidate scores. This leads them to vote sincerely and according to a simple behavioral rule we call the `Leader Rule'. At equilibrium, if a Condorcet-winner exists, this candidate is elected.

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Detail Information
Series Title
Journal of Theoretical Politics
Call Number
-
Publisher
California : Sage Publication.,
Collation
-
Language
English
ISBN/ISSN
0951-6298
Classification
-
Content Type
-
Media Type
-
Carrier Type
-
Edition
Volume 21, Number 1, January 2009. pp. 113-136
Subject(s)
rationality
Approval Voting
Condorcet
Sincerity
Strategic
The Leader Rule
Specific Detail Info
-
Statement of Responsibility
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