Journal Articles

Arguments-Based Collective Choice

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This article presents a model of collective choice when group decisions must be justified by arguments from first principles. Individuals may have preferences over both the actions chosen and the arguments used to justify them. Defining a notion of stability in the arguments made and actions supported within a group, I characterize the set of actions that can be justified as well as the arguments that will be used to justify these actions. Of particular interest in the article is the fact that each individual's preferences over different arguments are endogenously determined by the collection of actions justified by the arguments

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

London : Sage Publications., 2008

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

09516298

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 20, No. 4, July 2008. Page 379-414

Subject(s)

Deliberation
Analogy
Precedent
Preference Formation
Rhetoric
Arguments-Based Collective Choice

Specific Detail Info

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