Journal Articles

To Invest or Insure?: How Authoritarian Time Horizons Impact Foreign Aid Effectiveness

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In this article, the author argues that the time horizon a dictator faces affects his incentives over the use of aid in three ways. First, dictators have a greater incentive to invest in public goods when they have a long time horizon. Second, dictators with short time horizons often face the threat of challengers to the regime; this leads them to forgo investment and instead consume state resources in two forms that harm growth: repression and private pay-offs to political opponents. Third, dictators with short time horizons have a strong incentive to secure personal wealth as a form of insurance in case the regime falls. Using panel data on dictatorships in 71 developing countries from 1961 to 2001, the author finds that time horizons have a positive impact on aid effectiveness: Foreign aid is associated with positive growth when dictators face long time horizons and negative growth when time horizons are short

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Detail Information

Series Title

Comparative Political Studies

Call Number

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Publisher

London : Sage Publications., 2008

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0010-4140

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 41, No. 7, Page 971-1000

Subject(s)

Foreign aid
Dictatorships
Growth
Time Horizons
To Invest or Insure

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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