Journal Articles

Informative Party Labels With Institutional and Electoral Variation

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We study a model of party formation in which the informativeness of party labels and inter-party ideological heterogeneity are endogenously and jointly determined in response to electoral incentives. Parties use screening to increase the cost of affiliation for politicians whose ideal points diverge from the party platform. Because affiliation decisions are endogenous, increased screening decreases ideological heterogeneity, improving the informativeness of the party label. The model allows us to examine how the level of screening responds to changes in both the institutional and electoral environments. We find that screening (and, consequently, the informativeness of the party label and ideological homogeneity) is decreasing in the power of the executive branch, the polarization of party platforms, and the average size of partisan tides

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

London : Sage Publications., 2008

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0951-6298

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 20, No. 3, Page 251-273

Subject(s)

comparative institutions
endogenous affiliation
informative party labels
party discipline
screening

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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