Journal Articles

Bargaining in Committees of Representatives: The `Neutral' Voting Rule

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Committees are often made up of representatives, each of them acting on behalf of a group of individuals or
constituency of different size, who make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations
in the committee can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of an `adequate'
(in a sense to be specified) voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups that members represent. In this article we take a new departure to address this problem, assuming that the committee is a bargaining scenario in which negotiations take place `in the shadow of the voting rule' in search of consensus. That is, a general agreement is sought, but any winning coalition can enforce an agreement. In this context, the notion of a `neutral' voting rule, based on the compromise between equitableness and efficiency (or egalitarianism and utilitarianism) represented by the Nash bargaining solution, is founded, yielding a recommendation that differs from previous ones.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoritical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

California : Sage Publications., 2008

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0951-6298

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 20, No.1, January 2008. Page 93-106

Subject(s)

bargaining
Committees
Representative
Voting rules
Bargaining in Committees of Representatives

Specific Detail Info

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