Journal Articles

Political autonomy and independence: Theory and experimental evidence

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We use a game-theoretical model and results from laboratory experiments to study the process
by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favorable political status. In our
theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a political process.
This process involves two referenda, one at the level of the country as a whole and one at the
level of the subordinated region. If the political process succeeds, then the new autonomy level is
implemented. If this process fails, then both regions engage in a costly political conflict in which
both sides can spend resources to win the upper hand. We show that in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of our game the voting process leads to an intermediate arrangement acceptable for
both parts so that the costly political struggle never occurs. In contrast, in our experiments we
observe frequent fighting involving high material losses.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications., 2016

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0951-6298

Classification

NONE

Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 28, Issue 3, July 2016; pp. 461–496

Subject(s)

Collective actions
Rent-seeking
secession
independence movements

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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