Journal Articles

Heresthetics and choice from tournaments

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Moser et al. provide a formalization of heresthetics, the “art of political strategy”, in collective
choice settings. In doing so they introduce the heresthetically stable set as the set of outcomes
least susceptible to manipulation of issue dimension. In this note we correct a small error in the
original paper, and close several open questions asked there in. We examine the heresthetically
stable set as a tournament solution, establishing some basic properties it possesses, and many it
does not posses. In addition, we relate the heresthetically stable set to other tournament solutions,
notably the weak uncovered and refinements thereof. We find lack of vulnerability to heresthetic
manipulation is contrary to many desirable properties of choice functions, notably majoritarian support.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications., 2016

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0951-6298

Classification

NONE

Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 28, Issue 3, July 2016; pp. 385–407

Subject(s)

Banks set
Collective choice
heresthetically stable set

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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