Journal Articles

The Consequences of Presidential Patronage for Federal Agency Performance

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In this article, we examine the relationship between presidential patronage and federal agency performance. Using Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) management scores for 1,016 federal programs during the Bush Administration, we compare the performance of federal programs administered by appointees from the campaign or party against programs run by other appointees or career professionals. We introduce new means of overcoming the shortcomings of PART scores in order to make reliable inferences from this measure of federal program performance. We find that federal programs administered by appointees from the campaign or party earn lower PART scores than programs run by other appointees or by career executives. We conclude that although appointing persons from the campaign or party provides presidents an important source of political capital and arguably improves accountability, it also has costs for agency performance.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory

Call Number

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Publisher

Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press., 2012

Collation

p. 219-243

Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

1053-1858

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 22 Issue 2 April 2012 p. 219-243

Subject(s)

performance management
Administration
Presidential
Political aspects

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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