This paper considers an electoral model in which an incumbent and a challenger have ideological policy preferences that are private information. The incumbent may bias pre-electoral policies to signal preferences to the electorate with the aim of affecting the outcome of the election. When the two candidates are of completely different types, such a policy bias can occur only in a moder…
Why are judicial nominees allowed to refuse to answer questions about important issues that could come before the courts? We address this question by examining the information environment surrounding judicial nominations. Using the Supreme Court as our example, we formulate a model that departs from the existing literature by incorporating the fact that the Senate often does not know what…
This paper provides three versions of May’s theorem on majority rule, adapted to the one- dimensional model common in formal political modeling applications. The key contribution is that single peakedness of voter preferences allows us to drop May’s restrictive positive responsiveness axiom. The simplest statement of the result holds when voter preferences are single peaked and linear (n…
The 2016 Legislative Council (LegCo) election marked a watershed in the political development of Hong Kong. The vote reflected the emergence of increasing divisions within the democratic and pro-Beijing (or pro-establishment) camps, the institutionalization of post-Umbrella Movement activism, and especially the rise of localism. At its heart, Localism signifies a commitment to protecting the in…
In the years since the early 1990s, tolerance within the international community for coups d’état has waned, and a new “anti-coup norm” has become institutionalized in international rulebooks and laws. New standards have emerged that require international actors to help ensure that ousted leaders are returned to power and that coup leaders are excluded from future politics. Despite significant …