Journal Articles

Participation and boycott in authoritarian elections

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The existence of authoritarian elections raises a number of questions regarding the strategies of
political opposition. What explains the choice of strategy among key opponents of a regime?
What determines when opposition groups willingly participate in elections and when they engage
in electoral boycott? To understand the opposition’s strategic choices, we develop a formal
model of government–opposition interaction under authoritarianism. We contribute to the
literature on election boycotts in emphasizing the effect of uncertainty about the strength of the
regime on strategic decisions. The model produces predictions for several key features of
authoritarian elections, including the decision to participate, boycott, and mobilize against the
regime. Importantly and uniquely, the model provides an explanation for variation in opposition
strategies within a particular country. Using the case of Jordan, we illustrate how the results of
the model can be used to explain variation in opposition strategy across parliamentary elections.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications., 2017

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0951-6298

Classification

NONE

Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 29, Issue 1, January 2017; pp. 97–123

Subject(s)

Jordan
Boycotts
authorian elections
opposition strategy
incomplate information
Jordanian elections

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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